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On*the*Declining*Viability*of*Testosterone*
 
by Chris Pruett 
 
The traditional wisdom in the game industry is that tech sells. The 
formula is simple: games are aimed primarily at teenage and adult 
males, who also happen to be the target market for gadgets and films in 
which helicopters explode. This audience, it is believed, enjoys 
technology for the sake of technology; they are the group that bought 
HDTVs before anybody else, they are the group that outfits their car 
with expensive stereos, and they are the group that will spend money on 
new, technically advanced video games.  
 
In order to keep selling to this group, the game industry must continually 
improve the technology of its video games and systems. Since the late 
1980s, there has been a cycle of new video game system releases, each 
iteration improving on the computational performance of the last. The 
latest round of systems includes Sony's PlayStation 3 and Microsoft's 
Xbox360, which are powerful computers. Guys buy this stuff, the 
industry believes, because they enjoy knowing that their system is 
powerful enough to produce entertainment unlike any other video game 
system prior. The promise of raw performance is one of the industry's 
main marketing strategies.  
 
This mindset is something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because the 
industry believes that males interested in exploding helicopters and high-
end game tech are its target audience, the industry produces games that 
cater to that group almost exclusively. Games like God of War, Gears of 
War, Halo 3, and Call of Duty 4 are all squarely aimed at this group, and 
they are also shining examples of technologically advanced game 
software. These games look better than anything else on the market, and 
they are aimed at a group that is particularly interested in owning the 
best.  
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But there is a problem with this formula. Firstly, by catering to a single 
group exclusively, the game industry has systematically excluded other 
audiences. Entire game genres such as Adventure and Real Time 
Strategy have mostly died off because they were deemed to be liabilities 
in a market supported exclusively by young men. In 1993, Cyan Worlds 
released an adventure game called Myst, which sold so well and to such 
a wide audience that its sales numbers were not matched for a decade. 
Yet, today there are no games like Myst being produced, and most game 
publishers would not seriously consider revisiting its format. Over time, 
the "tech sells" mindset has caused the intended audience for video 
games to become more homogeneous, even as the size of that audience 
has expanded.  
The other problem with the game industry's formula is that technology 
gets more and more expensive to produce every time it improves. Since 
the game industry believes that it must jump on the latest tech every five 
to seven years, it is always on the bleeding edge and always paying 
bleeding-edge prices. This generation, the PlayStation 3 debuted at 599 
dollars, which was a significant jump over Sony's previous offering (the 
PlayStation 2 sells for 149 dollars). At the same time, this new hardware 
demands new, more complicated software, which in turn costs much 
more to develop. Ten years ago, a hit game could be made for less than a 
million dollars. Five years ago, the average was somewhere around five 
million dollars. Today, development budgets are in the thirty to fifty 
million-dollar range. Of course, the visual fidelity of modern games is 
vastly improved, but that improvement comes at a significant price.  
 
So, the video game industry has arrived here in 2008 and has discovered 
that it is quickly painting itself into a corner. The increased cost of game 
consoles has slowed consumer adoption, and since the cost of game 
development itself has also risen dramatically, developers are now faced 
with a situation in which they must spend much more money to sell their 
product to a much smaller group of customers. Developers are assuming 
a huge amount of risk, much more than has ever been necessary in the 
past, and as a result the market has fewer games. Even worse, because 
games have been aimed at such a narrow band of consumers for such a 
long time, there is a sameness to many of the titles currently reaching the 
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market; the helicopter exploding genre has a significant breadth in the 
game industry. There is research to suggest that only the top 10 percent 
of games are actually profitable. 
 
However, not all sectors of the game industry are feeling trapped. After 
placing third in console sales in the previous generation, Nintendo has 
turned around and produced two systems, the Wii and the DS, which are 
both leading the market by wide margins. Nintendo's success is based on 
its willingness to actively reject the old guard mentality that gamers 
want tech; instead of making a yet-more-powerful game system, the 
Kyoto Company is trying to knock down the barriers that prevent non-
gamers (that is, most people who are not young males) from playing 
games. They identified traditional game controllers as a source of 
intimidation for non-gamers, and so the new Nintendo systems use non-
standard (and non-threatening) control systems: a motion-sensitive 
remote on the Wii, and a stylus on the DS. Nintendo realized that the 
ultra-realistic art style that so many games pursue is not particularly 
attractive to many consumers, and have consequently branded its game 
systems with cute cartoon characters. The company has also 
aggressively targeted non-traditional gamers by running ads in 
magazines and TV shows aimed at middle-aged couples. Nintendo has 
even tried to reduce the cost of game development by making its 
systems easy to program and cutting the cost of its proprietary 
development kits. In short, this current round of offerings from Nintendo 
is a calculated and dramatic attempt to break away from the traditional 
game market.  
 
Interestingly, reaction to Nintendo's move within the industry is split. 
Most game developers are themselves men in their twenties and thirties, 
and many of them are having trouble coming to grips with an industry 
which no longer revolves around their group. Backlash at Nintendo from 
developers and gamers has arrived as accusations that Nintendo is 
"leaving the hard core fans behind," or that they have "sold out." One 
developer I spoke with hated the entire concept of the Wii because he's 
interested in making games about exploding helicopters. "But Chris," he 
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laments with a curl of the lip, "I don't want to make games about 
bowling."  
 
It is not that the traditional game development approach is invalid; it is 
simply no longer capable of supporting itself on exploding helicopter 
games aimed at young males alone. And the growth of games into non-
traditional markets is not limited to Nintendo. Developers who are not 
comfortable with Nintendo's approach might want to duck and cover at 
this point because the winds of change are a-blowin', and many of them 
emanate from a company that is not normally considered a force in the 
game industry.  
 
Apple's iPhone has the potential to change the video game industry 
dramatically. The target audience for the iPhone includes gamers, but it 
also includes a wide and diverse group of people who comprise a much 
larger customer base than just people who buy games. The iPhone's 
technology is good enough that it can host modern games, but at the 
same time the device is not sold on promises of its computational power. 
Some analysts believe that Apple will achieve sales of up to 45 million 
iPhones per year [1]; compare that to the 15 million PlayStation 3s that 
have sold in the two years since it was released. Even the PlayStation 2, 
one of the best-selling game systems of all time, only shipped 140 
million units over its eight year lifespan [2]. By all accounts, the iPhone 
is primed to eclipse every gaming system available in a very short 
amount of time.  
 
But the real value to the game industry is not just Apple's quickly-
expanding army of iPhone users. Games sold for the iPhone go through 
the iTunes store and are downloaded directly to the phone, with no 
physical packaging whatsoever. Apple takes a cut of each sale, but the 
economics are such that even a moderately successful application can be 
very profitable. The iPhone represents a low-cost, low-risk way to make 
games for a much larger audience; its revenue model is much less risky 
than a modern AAA videogame. The device is not the most powerful 
portable handheld system (that honor goes to Sony's PlayStation 
Portable, another system that is struggling to find a market), but the 
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audience for iPhone games is not likely to care about absolute visual 
fidelity or tech spec badges of honor.  
 
The Apple iPhone, the Nintendo Wii, and the other similar devices (such 
as Google's Android platform [3]) are primed to usher in a dramatic 
change to the way that the game industry operates. If profitability can be 
achieved without the need to constantly increase the cost of game 
development, game companies will have a way to experiment with new 
customers, marketing strategies, and game designs. The old guard is 
powerful in the game industry, and the makeup of the industry itself 
serves to reinforce its rather narrow view of gamers. But cheap, mass-
market devices like those peddled by Nintendo and Apple are likely to 
force even the most traditional game developers to consider alternatives 
to the status quo. 
 
Endnotes 
 
 [1] http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/07/06/07/iphone_yearly_sales 
_rate_should_top_45_million_by_2009_says_firm.html 
 
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PlayStation_2  
 
[3] Full disclosure: I am a Google employee.  
 
